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LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAS:
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE TO AMNESTIES FOR
ATROCITIES
DOUGLASS CASSEL*
I
INTRODUCTION
The last two decades of the Cold War saw human rights reach a low ebb in
Latin America.  From Argentina’s Dirty War1 and Chile’s General Pinochet in
the South,2 to bloodbaths of peasants in El Salvador3 and indigenous peoples in
Guatemala4 in the North, the continent was overrun by serious violations of
human rights.5  Few countries escaped.  Even today the region’s two largest na-
tions, Brazil and Mexico, suffer widespread and systematic patterns of police
torture (among other abuses),6 while massive violence stalks Colombia7 and
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1. See generally NUNCA MÁS, INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN
DE PERSONAS (1st Am. Ed. 1986).
2. See generally REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND REC-
ONCILIATION (Philip E. Berryman trans. 1993).
3. See generally FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR, REPORT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993)
[hereinafter TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT].
4. See, e.g., RICARDO FALLA, MASACRES DE LA SELVA: IXCAN, GUATEMALA , 1975-82 (1992).
5. “Serious” violations of human rights, for purposes of this article, mean violations committed
by or with the acquiescence of states or organized insurgencies, which take lives or jeopardize the
physical or mental integrity of human beings, and are done by acts that are criminal under national or
international law.  Examples are massacres of civilians, political assassinations, extrajudicial execu-
tions, forced disappearances, torture, rape and sexual assault, and prolonged detention in inhuman
conditions.
This is not to denigrate other important rights, such as the right to vote, freedoms of speech and as-
sociation, and discrimination.  It merely reflects the concern of this article with human rights violations
committed by means of felonious criminal conduct.  It is analogous to the “serious” violations of inter-
national humanitarian law in the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.  See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
6. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1997, at 80
(Brazil), 110 (Mexico) (1996) [hereinafter HRW 1997].  See generally PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE
KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 145-79 (Sao Paulo, Brazil), 227-48 (Mexico City)(1995);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEXICO: TORTURE WITH IMPUNITY 42 (1991) (“A principal factor why
torture is widespread is the almost total impunity extended to torturers.  Police officers implicated are
rarely subject to investigation and even less frequently prosecuted.”); MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEARTLAND ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN NEEDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE
OF LAWLESSNESS IN MEXICO: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE STATE OF OAXACA 28-29 (1996)
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rights are suspended in much of Peru.8
Part II of this article summarizes the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of
these violations, thanks in part to amnesty laws.  It poses the question of how
the international community should respond to amnesties conferred by na-
tional law.  Rather than proposing new treaties or customary international law,
it suggests that the international community and the United States adopt a
form of “soft law”—guidelines to assist their own officials in responding to fu-
ture amnesties.  Part III reviews relevant jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights and pertinent Inter-American trea-
ties.  Part IV considers three illustrative cases (Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Haiti), and Part V concludes with ten proposed guidelines, reflecting Inter-
American jurisprudence and treaties, for future international responses to am-
nesties for serious violations of human rights in the Americas.
II
OVERVIEW OF IMPUNITY  AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE IN THE
AMERICAS
A.  Impunity
Throughout the human rights tragedies of recent decades in the Americas,
perpetrators of human rights violations have enjoyed impunity from criminal or
civil prosecution.9  Only in Argentina have senior leaders of a ruthless regime
been prosecuted, and even this exception was due mainly to factors extraneous
to human rights and circumscribed by impunity for most officers implicated in
more than 10,000 disappearances.10  Elsewhere in the region, only in isolated
cases have prosecutions for serious violations of human rights been even par-
tially successful.11
                                                          
(“[C]ountless murders and other assaults on basic human rights have been ignored by both the Oax-
acan and Mexican federal government…. Even when crimes are investigated, arrest warrants fre-
quently remain unexecuted…. This consistent pattern of impunity itself violates Mexico’s international
obligation to ensure and respect human rights.”).
7. See HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 88.  See generally 1996 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. COMM’N H. RTS.
651-70 (1997)[hereinafter 1996 IAC].
8. See HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 116; 1996  IAC, supra note 7, at 735-39.
9. Impunity from criminal or civil prosecution, the focus of this article, need not mean impunity
from all legal or moral consequences.  For example, senior military and rebel commanders in El Salva-
dor were publicly named as responsible for political assassinations and extrajudicial executions by the
Truth Commission.  See TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 53-54, 152, 176.
10. See generally I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 82-103, 146-53, 417-38 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); II id. at 323-81.
11. Even these cases were arduous and imperfect at best.  The following are among the prominent
examples:  In Bolivia, former dictator General Luis García Meza was finally convicted in 1993 and ex-
tradited in 1995, after a prosecution lasting years, on both human rights and corruption charges arising
from 1980.  See generally Rene Antonio Mayorga, Democracy Dignified and an End to Impunity:  Bo-
livia’s Military Dictatorship on Trial, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULES OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 61 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).  See Matt Miller & Arthur Golden, Confronting the
brutal past: Fledgling Democracies turn on ruthless rulers, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 17,
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This blanket of impunity is both de facto and de jure.  In most countries,
police, prosecutors, and judges remain undertrained and underpaid.  They la-
bor in criminal justice systems hampered by grossly inadequate budgets, ar-
chaic and ineffective criminal procedures, endemic corruption, and politicized
leadership.  They are often selected through procedures that militate against
their independence.  And especially in human rights cases, they commonly face
violence, threats, suborning, and external political interference.12
In the 1990s, these causes of de facto impunity continue,13 even though mas-
                                                          
1995, available in NEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.  Human rights groups argue that other high-
ranking officers, equally guilty, were not prosecuted.  See TRIBUNAL PERMANENTE DE LOS PUEBLOS,
PROCESO A LA IMPUNIDAD DE CRIMENES DE LESA HUMANIDAD EN AMERICA LATINA, 1989-91, at
279, 286-87 (1991)[hereinafter PROCESO].
In Brazil in 1996, one military police agent and one policeman were convicted and sentenced to
lengthy prison terms, but several others were acquitted, for the 1993 murder of eight street children at
La Candelaria Church in Rio.  See LATIN AMERICAN NEWSLETTERS, LTD., LATIN AMERICA RE-
GIONAL REPORTS: Brazil, Jan. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
In Chile, the Supreme Court in 1995 upheld the convictions of the two top generals who formerly
directed Chilean intelligence for ordering the 1976 murder in Washington of Orlando Letelier, in
which American Ronni Moffitt was also killed.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 75 (1995) [hereinafter HRW 1996].  But no senior officers have
been convicted for the thousands of disappearances in Chile itself, and these two were jailed only after
a prolonged stand-off between military and civilian authorities in Chile.  Id. at 75-76.  For other pend-
ing cases in Chile, see part III.A.5 below.
In Ecuador, the former police commander, General Gilberto Molina, was among those convicted
and sentenced to two years imprisonment for covering up the 1988 disappearance and presumed
deaths of the two Restrepo brothers.  See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1995, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE REPORT TO COMM. ON INT’L RELS., U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., AND COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELS., U.S. SENATE, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., Joint Comm. Print April 1996, at 400
[hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1995].
In El Salvador, one colonel was convicted in 1991 for the murder of six Jesuit priests and their cook
and her daughter in 1989, but he was amnestied in 1993, and the high command, found by the U.N.
Truth Commission to have ordered the murders, was never prosecuted.  See generally MARTHA
DOGGETT, DEATH FORETOLD: THE JESUIT MURDERS IN EL SALVADOR (1993).
In Guatemala, an alleged assassin of anthropologist Myrna Mack was sentenced to prison in 1993,
but prosecution of higher-ups continues to be thwarted, despite strong evidence.  See HRW 1997, su-
pra note 6, at 100; HRW 1996, supra, at 96-97.
In Honduras, a colonel was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, and a sergeant to 10 years, for the
1991 rape and murder of a high school girl.  See COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1995, supra, at 451.  Mid- and
lower-level army personnel are currently being prosecuted for disappearances and torture in the 1980s,
despite great difficulties, and the Supreme Court ruled in 1996 that amnesty laws passed in 1987 and
1991 do not preclude judicial investigations of human rights violations, but the senior officers respon-
sible are yet to be charged.  See HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 108-09; HRW 1996, supra, at 106-08.
12. With respect to de facto impunity, see, e.g., Injustice for All: Crime and Impunity in Latin
America, 30 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 16-43 (1996) (Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, and
Venezuela); PROCESO, supra note 11 (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay); 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 655-58 (Colombia),
716-18 (Guatemala); Kai Ambos, Impunity and International Criminal Law: A Case Study on Colom-
bia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina, 18 H. RTS. L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing de facto impunity as well as
impunity due to military justice and states of emergency).
13. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
REPORT TO COMM. ON INT’L RELS., U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., AND COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., U.S.
SENATE, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Joint Comm. Print Feb. 1997 [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS FOR
1996].  While noting improvements in several countries, the Country Reports for 1996 repeatedly cite
problems of impunity.  For example:
Brazil: “[S]pecial courts for the uniformed police are, in many cases, overloaded,
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sively bloody regimes have now gradually given way to elected, civilian, consti-
tutional governments in all of Latin America and the Caribbean except Cuba.
Ironically, the transitions toward democracy have spurred yet another mecha-
nism of impunity.  Fearful that democratic change might bring accountability
for human rights violations, outgoing military regimes have insisted on a sort of
insurance policy, in case all other mechanisms of impunity fail:  amnesty laws.14
B.  Amnesties
In at least eleven countries—Argentina,15 Brazil,16 Chile,17 El Salvador,18
                                                          
rarely investigate effectively or bring fellow officers to trial, and seldom convict
abusers.  This separate system of special state police courts contributes to a climate
of impunity for police elements involved in extrajudicial killings or abuse of prisoners
and is thought to be the single largest obstacle to eliminating such abuses by police.”
Id. at 365.
Colombia: “Rampant impunity is at the core of the country’s human rights viola-
tions.  According to government reports, in from 97 to 99.5 percent of all crimes, the
lawbreakers are never brought to justice.”  Id. at 390.
El Salvador: “[W]idespread impunity continues to be a problem.”  Id. at 442.
Guatemala: “[T]he PAC’s, former civilian military commissioners, members of
the army, and the police committed serious human rights violations, including extra-
judicial killings, physical abuse, arbitrary arrest and detention, and death threats.
The security forces generally enjoyed impunity from the law.”  Id. at 455.
Mexico: “The Government continued, with limited success, its attempt to end the
‘culture of impunity’ surrounding the security forces ….”  Id. at 496.
Peru: “A 1995 law granted amnesty from prosecution to those who committed
human rights abuses during the war on terrorism from May 1980 to June 1995….
These events created considerable concern over military and police impunity for past
abuses.”  Id. at 541.
Venezuela: “The perpetrators of extrajudicial killings act with near impunity, as
the Government rarely prosecutes such cases.  The police often fail to investigate
crimes allegedly committed by their colleagues …[,] the civilian judicial system re-
mains highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt, and military courts are often strongly
biased in favor of members of the armed forces accused of abuse.”  Id. at 578.
14. See, e.g., Robert E. Norris, Leyes de Impunidad y los Derechos Humanos en las Américas: Una
Respuesta Legal, 15 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 47, 48-56
(Chile), 56-60 (Brazil), 60-65 (Honduras), 65-71 (Guatemala), 71-83 (Argentina), 84-92 (Uruguay), 92-
101 (El Salvador), 101-05 (Nicaragua), 106-09 (Suriname)(1992); I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra
note 10, at 82-103 (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), 146-53 (same), 319-20 and 327-29 (El Salvador), 417-
38 (Argentina); II id. at 323-81 (Argentina), 383-430 (Uruguay), 431-52 (Brazil), 453-509 (Chile); III
id. at 546-55 (El Salvador); Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to
Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 1 (1996) (Haiti); Ambos, supra note 12,
at 3-4 (Argentina, Chile, Peru).
15. See Norris, supra note 14, at 71-83; I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 417-38; II id. at
323-81; Alicia Consuela Herrera et al., cases nos. 10.147 et al., 1992-93 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. COMM’N
H. RTS. 41, 43 ¶ 6 (1993); see infra part III.A.2(b).
16. See Norris, supra note 14, at 56-60;  II TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 431-52.
17. See Norris, supra note 14, at 48-56; II TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 453-509;
Jorge Correa, Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chilean Case After Dictatorship, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455 (1992).  See generally Garay Hermosilla et al., Case no. 10.843; 1996 IAC,
supra note 7, at 156; infra part III.A.5.
18. See Norris, supra note 14, at 92-101; I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 319-20, 327-
29; III id. at 546-55; Las Hojas Massacre Case, Case no. 10.287, 1992-93 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. COMM’N
H. RTS. 88 ¶ 1 (1993) (Spanish)[hereinafter  Las Hojas]; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El
Salvador 69-77, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 (1994); DOGGETT, supra note 11, at 271-76; Margaret
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Guatemala,19 Haiti,20 Honduras,21 Nicaragua,22 Peru,23 Suriname,24 and Uru-
guay25—new civilian leaders have chosen or been compelled, sooner or later,
either to decree an amnesty for serious human rights violations,26 or to accept
one previously decreed by outgoing military rulers.
C.  The Response of the International Community
Much has been written on the vexing moral, political, and legal dilemmas
confronted by these newly emerging democracies in deciding whether to prose-
cute serious violations of human rights committed by prior regimes.27  Less at-
tention, however, has been paid to the role of the international community28
with regard to amnesties.29  What has been the record of the United Nations,30
                                                          
Popkin, El Salvador: A Negotiated End to Impunity?, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 198, 211-13 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995); see infra parts
III.A.2(b) and 3, IV.B.
19. See Norris, supra note 14, at 65-71; see also HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 102; 1996 IAC, supra
note 7, at 719-20; infra part IV.A.
20. See generally Scharf, supra note 14.  See infra part IV.A.
21. See Norris, supra note 14, at 60-65; HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 108-09, infra part III.A.2(a)
22. See Norris, supra note 14, at 101-05; John J. Moore, Jr., Note, Problems with Forgiveness:
Granting Amnesty under the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 43 STAN. L. REV. 733 (1991).
23. See, e.g., HRW 1996, supra note 11, at 116, 118, 119; 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 739-41.
24. See Norris, supra note 14, at 106-09.
25. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 14, at 84-92; II TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 383-430;
Hugo Leonardo et al., cases nos. 10.029 et al., 1992-1993 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. COMM’N H. RTS. 154,
161-62 ¶ 38 (1993); see infra part III.A.2(b).  See generally Lawrence Weschler, The Great Exception:
I—Liberty, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 3, 1989, at 43; Lawrence Weschler, The Great Exception: II—
Impunity, Apr. 10, 1989, at 85.
26. Not all amnesties, of course, are contrary to human rights or the rule of law.  For example,
following non-international armed conflicts, article 6(5) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions calls
for the “broadest possible amnesty.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614; see part III.A.6 infra.  Amnesties are also expressly contemplated by article 4
of the American Convention on Human Rights, infra note 76, and article 6(4) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, infra note 107.
27. See, e.g., Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State
Criminals?, 12 HUMAN RTS. Q. 1 (1990); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11; Juan Mendez, Ac-
countability for Past Abuses, 19 HUMAN RTS. Q. 255 (1997); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); José
Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies
Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425 (1992); José Zalaquett, Confront-
ing Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political
Constraints, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 23, 26-65 (Aspen Institute, 1989), reprinted
in I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 3.
28. “International community” is a term oft-criticized, with justification, as a contradiction in
terms.  Here it loosely refers, for purposes of Latin America and the Caribbean, to the U.N., the OAS,
the U.S. as the dominant power in the hemisphere, and the nations comprising the various “groups of
friends” in support of peace processes.  For the Salvadoran peace process, for example, the group of
friends consisted of Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, and de facto the United States.  See Thomas
Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 497,
499, 542-43 (1994).  For the Guatemalan peace process, it consisted of Colombia, Mexico, Norway,
Spain, the United States, and Venezuela.  See, e.g., Guatemalan Foes Renounce Use of Arms, Ending
35-Year War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at A9.
29. Although the book does not focus on the issue of amnesty, the broader context of U.N. insider
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the Organization of American States (“OAS”), and their human rights and
peacemaking arms, as well as of Uncle Sam?  Before amnesties were enacted,
did they discourage or encourage them?  Afterward, did they validate or repu-
diate them?
With Latin America’s systematically lawless regimes mostly in the past and
a permanent international criminal court perhaps soon to be established, now is
an opportune moment to study the international response to the region’s wave
of amnesties.
The question is important not only because its answer has not (to my
knowledge) been systematically charted, but because in transitional situations,
the international community is not limited, at least not to the same degree, by
the agonizing choices facing national leaders of new democracies.  A General
Pinochet can warn a new civilian president “not to touch a single hair of a sin-
gle soldier”31 lest Chile’s democratic process come to an abrupt halt.  But the
United Nations Security Council, the OAS Permanent Council, and the White
House need not yield to the same blackmail.  A General Pinochet can unseat a
President Aylwin, but not a Secretary-General or a U.S. President.
This fact of realpolitik has two vital consequences.  First, the international
community, while not unconstrained,32 has greater freedom of rhetoric and ac-
tion than do national leaders in transitional situations.  At best, if hopes for an
international criminal court materialize through a treaty in 1998, that court may
                                                          
attitudes toward human rights generally is brought to light in IAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAP-
PEARANCES: ARGENTINA’S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(1990).
30. In an article evidently completed shortly before the November 1995 Dayton Accords, Profes-
sor Scharf referred to the
modern practice of the United Nations, which in the last three years has worked to block
mention of prosecuting former Khmer Rouge leaders for their atrocities from inclusion in the
Cambodia peace accords, pushed the Mandela government to accept an unconditional am-
nesty for crimes committed by the apartheid regime in South Africa, and … helped negotiate,
and later endorsed, a broad amnesty for the Haitian military regime.  As one commentator
recently remarked, “[w]hereas the human rights organs of the United Nations have devel-
oped clearer and more elaborate guidelines on the required treatment of past human rights
violations, the peacekeeping branches of the United Nations … have subordinated those
guidelines to an ill-advised effort to bring even mass murders into the political process, in the
hopes they can be placated, reformed, or at least isolated.”
Scharf, supra note 14, at 37 (footnotes omitted).
This “modern practice” is mellowed by the subsequent Dayton Accords, approved by the United
Nations, in which negotiators refused to yield to strong pressures to allow an amnesty.  See U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, TEXT
OF DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT DOCUMENTS OF NOV. 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter
DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS]; art. IX, id. at 90; Annex 4, art. III(8), id. at 120; Annex 6, art. XIII(4), id.
at 135; Annex 7, art. VI, id. at 138; Annex 11, art. VI(1) and (2), id. at 152.
31. II TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 454.
32. Haiti is a case in point.  See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 14, at 12 (“during the negotiations with the
Haitian military leaders, … broader long-term concerns were eclipsed behind the overriding objective
of avoiding American casualties in a military operation that did not have the support of the American
people”), 15 (“the international community proved unwilling to pay the price for justice, which would
have required sending troops into Haiti to dislodge the military regime and to protect the new gov-
ernment from rebellions while prosecutions of the military leaders were pending”).
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be able to prosecute internationally those who cannot be prosecuted nation-
ally.33  Of course, as experience with the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia34 and Rwanda35 shows, international prosecutions have
unique problems of their own—mainly in securing physical custody of defen-
dants and the cooperation of multiple states in investigations, apprehensions,
detentions, and prosecutions.36
But the international community can at least refrain from accepting amnes-
ties for serious violations of human rights as valid defenses before international
prosecutions.37  And between the extremes of national amnesties and interna-
tional prosecutions, the United Nations and OAS have a range of options.
Even if they cannot compel national prosecutions, they can still repudiate am-
nesties for human rights violators publicly38 and diplomatically,39 undercutting
                                                          
33. See generally Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 177 (1997).  According to
one report, in the August 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting of the working group on complemen-
tarity, “It was generally agreed that amnesties should not serve the purpose of shielding the perpetra-
tors from international criminal responsibility.”  NGO Coalition for an ICC (Aug. 13, 1997) (on file
with author).  However, in what may reflect a contrary view, the U.S. delegation circulated a draft en-
titled State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons (Aug. 1997) (on file with author).
34. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para. 2 of S.C.Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Statute].
35. See U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1168 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994)
[hereinafter Rwanda Statute].
36. See generally Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (1997);
Richard J. Goldstone, War Crimes: When Amnesia Causes Cancer, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 1997
(available in NEXIS, News Library, Curnws File); Tom Warrick, The Price of Justice in
Rwanda/Bosnia-Hercegovina, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 12, 1997 (available in NEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File).
37. In the Las Hojas case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found an El Salva-
dor amnesty law, as applied to the perpetrators of an alleged massacre of 74 civilians, contrary to the
American Convention on Human Rights.  See 1993 ANN. REP. COMM’N H. RTS. 88 (1993) (Spanish).
The Commission noted that article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties bars a State
from unilaterally invoking its national law as justification for not complying with international treaty
obligations.  See id. at 96 ¶ 12.
Cf. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946)(“He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under International Law”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(4)(“The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Gov-
ernment … shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment …”), in Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 34, at 15.
And the President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, rejecting a U.S. proposal that rules allow low-level
perpetrators immunity in exchange for their testimony, explained, “The persons appearing before us
will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and
other inhumane acts.  After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune from
prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be.”  Scharf,
supra note 14, at 37 (footnote omitted).
38. For example, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, albeit for insufficient reason
(see part IV.B below), publicly criticized the amnesty passed by El Salvador after the Truth Commis-
sion report was published.  See Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Chief Signals Disapproval of Salvadoran Am-
nesty, Reuters Mar. 24, 1993 (available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnews file).
39. Despite pressures, the United States refused to agree to an amnesty in the Dayton Peace Ac-
cords, supra note 30.  See, e..g., Jonathan S. Landay & David Rohde, Imperfect Peace Dogs U.S. in
Bosnia, THE CHRISTIAN  SCIENCE  MONITOR, Dec. 4, 1995 (available in, NEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File).
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claims of moral legitimacy by the beneficiaries.  They can deny the legal valid-
ity of amnesties for such purposes as extradition40 and political asylum.41  And
they can disallow amnesties as defenses to civil42 and criminal43 prosecutions in
other states.
Second, the impact of the international community’s posture on the internal
balance of political power in transitional states is important for amnesties.  Be-
fore transitions, that is, while wars rage or de facto regimes reign, a credible Se-
curity Council insistence on prosecution, precluding amnesty, may deter atroci-
ties in the first place.44  And clear international boundaries on what sorts of
crimes may be amnestied can weigh heavily in national political debates.
In Guatemala in 1996, for example, one of the few cards held by amnesty
opponents was the argument that the international community would not ac-
cept a blanket amnesty for crimes against humanity.45  While the United Na-
tions’ record in Guatemala was far from exemplary, as discussed below, it did
not entirely concede this issue.  If it had, the amnesty would have been broader.
In short, the world and regional community’s posture toward amnesties is
important on both international and national planes.
D.  Guidelines for International Organizations
This reality opens the way to greater flexibility in the procedural forms
needed for effective international limits on amnesties.  If all that mattered were
state behavior, there might be little value in internal United Nations or OAS
                                                          
40. See, e.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. IV and
VII, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. VIII(2), IX, X, XI, Dec. 10,
1984, U.N. doc. A/RES/39/46 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
41. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 40, art. VII; Declaration on Territorial Asylum,
G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) (“The right to
seek and enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any person with respect to whom there are serious rea-
sons for considering that he has committed a … crime against humanity ….”).
42. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
43. “Interior Minister says warrant for Galtieri’s arrest ‘inadmissible’,” BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Apr. 3, 1997 (reporting on Spanish judge’s arrest warrant for former Argentine junta
leader’s role in kidnapping and murder of four Spanish citizens) (available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File).
44. “[A]s recently suggested by Professor Buergenthal in congressional hearings on the former
Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council can play a preemptive role, with potential deterrent effect, by
resolving in specific situations that no future amnesty for human rights violators will be internationally
respected.”  I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 329 (excerpting Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., In-
ternational Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN INST. Q. 77 (1993)).  Professor Scharf endorses
this suggestion.  See Scharf, supra note 14, at 41 & n. 266.
Consider, for example, the experience of the former head of Civil Affairs for UNPROFOR in
Yugoslavia during 1992-94.  See Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal, 104 FOREIGN
POLICY 72 (1996).  He recounts,  “We told the local Belgrade and Zagreb authorities that if they did
not act, we would either tell the press or go to a higher authority:  the secretary-general, the Security
Council, or some future tribunal…. Our interlocutors plainly were skeptical that the ‘international
community’ would do anything.”  Id. at 77.  He concludes, “Had there been, from the start in Yugosla-
via, a high probability of judicial punishment for those who committed crimes against humanity, there
would have been less barbarism ….  Those who tried to mitigate some of the horrors … would have
found their hand greatly strengthened.”  Id. at 81.
45. See infra part IV.A.
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guidelines governing only the behavior of officials of these international or-
ganizations.  Some form of international law would be essential to bind states.
Indeed, treaties,46 as well as declarations and other instruments giving rise to
customary international law,47 are critical in restricting the states’ freedom of
action to award amnesties for atrocities.
However, because the behavior of the international community can itself be
an important constraint on amnesties, internal directives for United Nations or
OAS officials can be helpful.  Suppose, for example, that a U.N. policy direc-
tive governing the Secretariat’s conduct of peacekeeping missions had provided
clear guidance to negotiators on the scope of amnesty they could propose in
Haiti or accept in Guatemala, and to the United Nations Truth Commission in
El Salvador.  In each case, as discussed below, that might have made a differ-
ence.
Guidelines could clarify as well as fortify international resistance to over-
broad amnesties.  For example, in Guatemala, part of the problem was that
some senior U.N. officials simply did not know which crimes could be amnes-
tied without transgressing the murky boundaries of relevant international hu-
man rights and humanitarian law.  This confusion undermined their resolve.
Not only may guidelines for international organizations (even without di-
rectly binding states) be helpful in practice, they may also be easier to imple-
ment.  Treaties limiting amnesties require ratification.  If military regimes ref-
use to ratify them or to permit transitional governments to do so, the treaties
may not apply in the very states in which they are most needed.48  Similarly,
customary law requires a general acceptance and consistent practice by states
that may be difficult to achieve.49
                                                          
46. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 148 (obligation to prosecute or extradite grave breaches); Geno-
cide Convention, supra note 40, arts. 4, 5 (obligation to prosecute genocide, which could be an issue in,
for example, Guatemala); Torture Convention, supra note 40, arts. 4, 5, 7(1); Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968,
754 U.N.T.S. 73 [hereinafter Imprescriptibility Convention].
47. See, e.g., Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Pun-
ishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. G.A. Res. 3074
(XXVIII) (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 230 (1974) (adopted by vote of 94-0, with 29 abstentions).
Paragraph 8 provides, “States shall not take any legislative or other measures which may be prejudicial
to the international obligations they have assumed in regard to the detection, arrest, extradition and
punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
48. For example, only 43 States worldwide have ratified the Imprescriptibility Convention, supra
note 46.  See UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS: MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS STATUS AS AT 31
MAY 1997, at 20 (1997).
49. In 1988, the Aspen Institute and the Ford Foundation … conference on “State Crimes:
Punishment or Pardon” … brought together … leading academic and governmental experts
on the issue of the responsibility of states to prosecute the gross violations of human rights
committed by the prior regimes.  The Conference participants reached consensus that there
was no duty under customary international law to prosecute such violators ….
Scharf, supra note 14, at 28 (footnote omitted).
There is a stronger argument, however, that customary international law prohibits amnesties for
human rights violations that rise to the level of crimes against humanity.  Compare, e.g., M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 492, 500-01 (1992),
with Scharf, supra note 14, at 34-39.
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Internal United Nations or OAS guidelines, on the other hand, may short-
cut the slow processes of ratifying treaties or developing custom.  A vote of the
governing body, reflecting a momentary consensus or majority, may suffice.
For example, the OAS General Assembly, by vote in 1991, adopted a Resolu-
tion on Representative Democracy requiring the organization to respond to in-
terruptions of democracy in any American state, a step that would not have
been politically feasible a decade earlier.50  Similarly, taking advantage of the
current relative absence of brutally repressive states in the hemisphere, the
OAS General Assembly could adopt, for example, a “Declaration against Am-
nesties for Gross Violations of Human Rights,” directing a comparable organ-
izational response to amnesties.
E.  Guidelines for Uncle Sam?
The United States, too, can have an important influence on amnesties for
serious violations of human rights in the hemisphere, both through its role in
the United Nations and OAS, and directly through its foreign policy.  Serious
questions may be raised, of course, about whether that is a good thing.  U.S.
military and intelligence relationships with Latin American human rights viola-
tors have too often served to reinforce impunity.51  Recently, for example, the
U.S. refused to extradite a former CIA asset accused of political murders to
Haiti,52 while the CIA was allegedly slow to inform the U.S. Ambassador that
an asset in the Guatemalan military may have been involved in an extrajudicial
                                                          
Prohibiting amnesties for crimes against humanity is of more than academic interest for Latin
America.  Crimes against humanity include many  offenses committed in Latin America in recent
years, such as widespread or systematic assassinations and other inhumane acts directed against civil-
ian populations for political or ethnic reasons, Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 34, art. 5; Rwanda Stat-
ute, supra note 35, art. 3, and forced disappearances.  OAS General Assembly Res. AG/RES. 666
(XIII-0/83), Nov. 18, 1983, cited with approval in the Velásquez-Rodríguez case, 1988 ANN. REP. INT.-
AM. CT. H. RTS., 35, 67 ¶ 153 (1988), and in the preamble to the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearances, infra note 145.
In addition, serious violations of human rights in armed conflicts in countries like Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru may be deemed war crimes, even when the conflicts are
non-international in character.  Tadic, Judgment of the Appellate Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995, at ¶¶ 88, 134, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 61,
71 (1996).  There are strong arguments that serious war crimes may not be amnestied.  See, e.g., Prin-
ciples of International Cooperation, supra note 47, ¶¶ 1 and 8; Scharf, supra note 14, at 20 and n.139.
50. OAS G.A. Res., Representative Democracy, Res. AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), June 5, 1991, re-
printed in THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS, CASES AND MATERIALS 499-500 (4th rev. ed. 1995).  In the event of an interruption of
democracy, the Resolution instructs the Secretary-General to call for an immediate meeting of the
Permanent Council, which is instructed to decide on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers or of the Gen-
eral Assembly to “adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and inter-
national law.”  Id. at 500.
51. See, e.g., MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE 110-39 (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1994, at 99 (1993); see also the statement of former
CIA officer David MacMichael, Participación de los Estados Unidos de América en la Impunidad de
Crimenes de Lesa Humanidad en América Latina, in PROCESO, supra note 11, at 455.
52. See HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 105; see generally the occasional articles by Allan Nairn in
THE NATION, e.g., Haiti Under Cloak, Feb. 26, 1996;  He’s Our S.O.B.,  Oct. 31, 1994.
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execution.53
On the other hand, often under congressional pressure, the U.S. has at
times used aid leverage to insist on prosecution of particular human rights cases
in such countries as Chile,54 El Salvador,55 and Guatemala.56  Building on such
precedents, Congress could explore more general U.S. guidelines on impunity,
at a minimum barring U.S. officials from endorsing or supporting amnesties for
serious violations of human rights.57  It might have been helpful, for example, if
U.S. law or an Executive Order had imposed human rights boundaries on the
discretion of presidential envoy Jimmy Carter to propose or accept an amnesty
in Haiti.
F.  Conclusion of Overview
A thorough study of the international community’s record with regard to
Latin American amnesties, although beyond the scope of this initial foray, is
warranted.  Even this preliminary sketch, however, suggests that the actions of
the international community toward amnesty merit self-regulation through ar-
ticulation of clearly defined boundaries on what amnesties may be accepted or
proposed by U.N. and OAS diplomats and officials.
III
APPLICABLE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
In addition to treaties58 and customary law59 referred to above, since 1992,
there has been a significant body of Inter-American human rights jurispru-
dence and treaty law on impunity that diplomats should have been aware of
and taken into account in subsequent peace negotiations.
Part A of this section of the article summarizes the jurisprudence, beginning
with the early (mid-1980s) guidance offered by the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights on amnesty laws.  It then discusses the landmark 1988
ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on impunity for disap-
pearances in Honduras.  There follows an analysis of three resolutions of the
Inter-American Commission in 1992 on amnesties in Argentina, El Salvador,
                                                          
53. See Tim Weiner, In Furor Over Killings, President Warns of Shake-up in the CIA, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1995, A1; see also HRW 1996, supra note 11, at 98-99.
54. Congress made U.S. aid to Chile dependent on progress in prosecution in the Orlando Letelier
murder case which, as a result, was exempted from Chile’s amnesty.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1990, at 127 (1991).
55. In 1990 Congress made aid to El Salvador contingent in part on a serious and professional in-
vestigation and prosecution of the Jesuits murder case.  See id. at 167.
56. See id. at 181-83.
57. Professor Scharf suggests that perhaps U.S. policy on amnesties for serious violations of hu-
man rights should “parallel U.S. policy with respect to terrorism, which prohibits the government from
‘making concessions of any kind to terrorists’ on the ground that ‘such actions would only lead to more
terrorism.’”  Scharf, supra note 14, at 39 (footnote omitted) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, at iii (1989)).
58. See supra note 46.
59. See supra note 49.
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and Uruguay; the Commission’s 1994 report on the 1993 amnesty in El Salva-
dor; a 1994 United Nations Human Rights Committee decision on the Uru-
guayan amnesty; and the Commission’s most recent decisions: its 1996 resolu-
tions on Chile’s failure to repeal the 1978 “self-amnesty” enacted by the
military regime.  After briefly considering the applicable international humani-
tarian law on amnesties in non-international conflicts, this part summarizes the
guidelines emerging from the Inter-American jurisprudence.
Part B then reviews recent OAS treaties imposing duties to prosecute tor-
ture, forced disappearances, and violence against women.
A.  Jurisprudence
1.  The Inter-American Commission’s Early Guidance.  Following the return
of democracy in Argentina, the Inter-American Commission in 1986 published
general guidelines on the responsibilities of democratic governments to
investigate and remedy human rights violations under prior regimes.60
Unfortunately, the Commission characterized the issue as one in which the
contribution of international bodies is “minimal.”61 Still, it offered two
guidelines for nations grappling with the problem.  First, only amnesties
enacted by democratically elected bodies, not self-amnesties by the abusive
regime itself, have legal validity.62  Second, even democratically enacted
amnesties must respect the need to investigate, because both society and the
families of victims have the right to know the truth.63  “Every society,” the
Commission declared, “has the inalienable right to know the truth about past
events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came
to be committed, in order to prevent repetition… .”64  “Moreover, the family
members of the victims are entitled to information as to what happened to their
relatives.”65  The Commission did not suggest, however, that judicial
                                                          
60. 1985-86 ANN. REP. INT. AM. COMM’N H. RTS. 191-93 (1986) [hereinafter 1985-86 REPORT]
(in section entitled Areas in which Steps Need to be Taken Towards Full Observance of the Human
Rights Set Forth in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights).
61. The commission noted that it
recognizes that this is a sensitive and extremely delicate issue where the contribution it—or
any other international body for that matter—can make is minimal.  The response, therefore,
must come from the national sectors which are themselves affected, and the urgent need for
national reconciliation and social pacification must be reconciled with the ineluctable exigen-
cies of an understanding of the truth and of justice.
 Id. at 192.
62. The commission
considers that only the appropriate democratic institutions—usually the legislature—with the
participation of all the representative sectors, are the only ones called upon to determine
whether or not to decree an amnesty [or] the scope thereof, while amnesties decreed previ-
ously by those responsible for the violations have no juridical validity.
Id. at 192-93.  For an eloquent elaboration of this point, see the Chilean Hermosilla case, infra note
111, at 163-66 ¶¶ 26-39.
63. See 1985-86 REPORT, supra  note 60, at 193.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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proceedings were essential: the truth could be pursued by either “investigating
committees … or … the judiciary.”66
If, in hindsight, the Commission’s initial venture into the subject seems too
timid, it should be borne in mind that the spread of democratic states in the
Americas appeared far less assured in the mid-1980s than in the mid-1990s,67
and that the Inter-American Court at that time had yet to develop its ground-
breaking case law on the affirmative duties of states to “ensure” human rights.
2.  Inter-American Case Law As of 1992.  During 1988 through 1992, in cases
from four countries, the Inter-American Court and Commission developed
jurisprudence on impunity and amnesties for human rights violations.  That
jurisprudence has since been clarified by the Commission’s 1996 resolutions in
the Chilean cases, discussed below.  However, the cases through 1992 are
discussed separately here, because they were available to U.N., OAS, and U.S.
officials in negotiating and commenting on amnesties in the cases summarized
below (Guatemala in 1996, Haiti in 1993-94, El Salvador in 1992-93).
All four cases through 1992 involved serious violations: forced disappear-
ances in Honduras;68 an army massacre of 74 civilians in El Salvador;69 forced
disappearances and kidnapping of children in Uruguay;70 and forced disappear-
ances, summary executions, torture, and kidnapping in Argentina.71  Both the
court and commission stressed the seriousness of the violations.  In the Hondu-
ras case, the court was at pains to note that forced disappearances are crimes
against humanity.72  In the Uruguay case, the Commission emphasized that it
must also weigh the nature and gravity of the events with which the [amnesty] law
concerns itself; alleged disappearances of persons and the abduction of minors,
among others, have been widely condemned as a particularly grave violation of hu-
man rights.  The social imperative of their clarification and investigation cannot be
equated with that of a mere common crime.73
While the court and commission did not expressly limit their holdings to such
                                                          
66. Id. (emphasis added).  “Such access to the truth presupposes freedom of speech …; the estab-
lishment of investigating committees whose membership and authority must be determined in accor-
dance with the internal legislation of each country, or the provision of the necessary resources so that
the judiciary itself may undertake whatever investigations may be necessary.”  Id.
67. The Commission concluded cautiously that it “considers that the observance of the principles
cited above will bring about justice rather than vengeance, and thus neither the urgent need for na-
tional reconciliation nor the consolidation of democratic government will be jeopardized.”  Id.
68. See Velásquez-Rodríguez, 1988 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. CT. H. RTS. 35 (1988) [hereinafter
Velásquez].  There were three Honduran disappearance cases, but for this article, they are treated as
one.  The Court’s opinion in the second case, Godínez Cruz, 1989 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. CT. H. RTS. 15,
16 (1989), is nearly identical to Velásquez.  In the third case, Fairén Garbí, 1989 ANN. REP. INT.-AM.
CT. H. RTS. 69, 105-06 ¶¶ 156-61 (1989), the court found insufficient proof of Honduras’s responsibil-
ity because of the possibility the victims might have been disappeared in a neighboring country.
69. See Las Hojas Massacre Case, case no. 10.287, 1992-1993 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. COMM’N H.
RTS. 88 ¶ 1 (1993) (Spanish) [hereinafter  Las Hojas].
70. See Hugo Leonardo et al., case nos. 10.029 et al., 1992-1993 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. COMM’N  H.
RTS. 154, 161-62 ¶  38 (1993) [hereinafter Leonardo].
71. See Alicia Consuela Herrera et al., case nos. 10.147 et al., 1992-93 ANN. REP. INT.-AM.
COMM’N H. RTS. 41, 43 ¶ 6 (1993) [hereinafter Herrera].
72. See Velásquez, supra note 68, at 66-68 ¶¶ 149-58;
73. Leonardo, supra note 70, at 161-62 ¶ 38.
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serious violations, in light of these statements and the factual context of the
cases, their opinions may reasonably be read to concern impunity for serious
violations of human rights.
a.  The inter-American court and impunity in Honduras.  The court’s 1988
judgment in the Honduras case found a pattern of de facto impunity in the early
1980s, including repeated failures of  habeas corpus petitions and criminal
proceedings to locate or protect victims of disappearances.74  The court
concluded that Honduran judicial remedies were so “ineffective” that they
need not be exhausted prior to recourse to the Inter-American system.75
The court also ruled that this pattern of impunity violated Honduras’s duty
under article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights76 to “ensure”
the free exercise of human rights.77  The court interpreted this language to im-
pose on the state a “legal duty to take reasonable steps … to use the means at
its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations …, to identify those
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment[,] and to ensure the victim
adequate compensation ….”78
Under the court’s ruling in the Honduras case, then, in cases involving seri-
ous violations of human rights, the state has a general duty to take reasonable
steps to investigate, to identify those responsible, and to prosecute and punish.
But what if the state enacts an amnesty?  Can an amnesty relieve it of the duty
to investigate and prosecute?
While the case was pending before the court, Honduras passed an amnesty
apparently covering those responsible for the disappearance at issue.79  The
court was doubtless aware of the amnesty, enacted shortly before final hearings
before the court.80  Yet Honduras did not assert the amnesty in defense, and the
court, in ruling that Honduras violated its prosecutorial duty, made no mention
of it.
One might conclude, then, that a national amnesty provides no exemption
from the international duty to punish serious violations of human rights.81
However, the inference is not ironclad.  The court ordered Honduras to com-
pensate the family, but did not direct it also to prosecute and punish those re-
sponsible.82  If Honduras had such a duty notwithstanding the amnesty, why did
the court not order its execution?
                                                          
74. Velásquez, supra note 68, at 47-52 ¶¶ 50-81.
75. Id. at 52 ¶ 81.
76. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36, at 1, OAS Off.Rec.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2.
77. Article 1(1) provides in part as follows: “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdic-
tion the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination ….”  Id.
78. Velásquez, supra note 68, at 71 ¶ 174 (emphasis added).
79. Decreto No. 199-87, adopted Nov. 29, 1987.  See generally Norris, supra note 14, at 62-65.
80. See Decreto No. 199-87, supra note 79.
81. Robert Norris so concluded.  See Norris, supra note 14, at 64-65.
82. See Velásquez, supra note 68, at 74-76 ¶¶ 189-94.
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b.  The inter-American commission and amnesties in Argentina, El
Salvador, and Uruguay.  In the three 1992 cases, the commission expressly
addressed amnesties in light of the duty to prosecute human rights violations
enunciated by the court in the Honduran case.  The three amnesties before the
commission covered the gamut—from worst to best—of responses by
transitional governments to serious human rights violations under prior
regimes.
In El Salvador, an “absolute and complete” amnesty, adopted in 1987 as
part of the Central American Esquipulas peace process, barred both criminal
and civil prosecutions, making no allowance for either investigations or com-
pensation of victims.83  If ever an amnesty violated a state’s duty to guarantee
human rights, this was it.84
Argentina, by contrast, argued correctly that its amnesty process was the
most defensible in all of Latin America: Despite amnesty laws, top military
commanders were convicted and imprisoned, an official commission exten-
sively investigated and publicly reported on disappearances, substantial com-
pensation was available to victims’ families, and the government had pro-
claimed, “Never again.”85  If ever an amnesty for serious human rights
violations did not violate the state’s duties, this was it (at least in Latin Amer-
ica).86
The Uruguay amnesty was somewhere in between.  Unlike any other Latin
American amnesty, its democratic credentials were bolstered by its approval by
voters in a referendum,87 albeit in what might be called a “shotgun referen-
dum.”88  Moreover, in theory, Uruguay barred only criminal prosecution; civil
suits for damages remained possible.  However, the commission found that by
barring judicial investigation and hence the possibility of compelling military
and police officials to testify, the practical effect of the amnesty “substantially
restricted” victims’ ability to pursue civil remedies.89
                                                          
83. See Las Hojas Case, supra note 69, at 95-96 ¶ 11.
84. The same could be said of the Chilean military regime’s “self-amnesty,” discussed in subpart 5
below.  At the time the Commission decided the Las Hojas case involving the Salvadoran amnesty law,
it knew that the government had agreed in the January 1992 peace accords to a U.N. Truth Commis-
sion to investigate important cases of violence during the war.  However, the Truth Commission re-
port, supra note 3, was not issued until March of 1993.  So when the Inter-American  Commission de-
cided  Las Hojas in 1992, it could not know that the Truth Commission would later report on the case,
naming names of those responsible.  See id. at 76.
85. Herrera, supra note 71, at 43 ¶ 7, 46 ¶¶ 25-28, 50 ¶¶ 42-48.
86. One might argue that the South African approach, of allowing amnesty only in exchange for
credible confession, is even more defensible than the Argentinian response.  See, e.g., Peter Parker,
The Politics of Indemnities, Truth Telling and Reconciliation in South Africa; Ending Apartheid Without
Forgetting, 17 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1996); Daniel F. Wilhelm, Note, Azanian Peoples Organization v.
President of South Africa, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 360 (1997).  But no state in the Americas has to date
adopted the South African approach.
87. See Leonardo, supra note 70, at 166 ¶ 22, 168 ¶ 31.  See generally Weschler, supra note 25.
88. See Norris, supra note 14, at 85-90.  The amnesty originally went into effect only one hour be-
fore a colonel was due to testify in court on a kidnapping; it was expected that the colonel would refuse
to appear.  Id. at 85.  The amnesty was later approved by 57% of those voting in a referendum, but
only after public threats by military leaders.  Id. at 90.
89. Leonardo, supra note 70, at 165 ¶ 53.  The United Nations Human Rights Committee later
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Despite these variations, the commission reached the same result in each
case.  The amnesties violated at least three, and possibly four, distinct duties of
the state under the American Convention.  First, they violated the state obliga-
tionpart of its duty to “ensure” human rights under article 1(1)to investi-
gate violations.90  Second, at least in states that permit victims to participate in
criminal proceedings,91 the amnesties violated the state duty under article 8(1)
to afford victims a fair trial.92  Third, the amnesties violated rights of victims
and survivors to adequate compensation, required both by article 1(1)93 and by
the right to judicial protection under article 25.94
In other words, when serious violations of human rights are committed,
states must investigate, must permit victims to participate in judicial investiga-
tions where permitted by national laws, and must ensure adequate compensa-
tion for violations.  States may not excuse themselves by enacting amnesty
laws.
                                                          
reached the same conclusion.  Hugo Rodríguez v. Uruguay, Comm. no. 322/1988, Views of July 19,
1994, at 7 ¶ 12.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994) [hereinafter Rodríguez] (“[T]he Commit-
tee finds that the … Law … and subsequent practice in Uruguay have rendered the realization of the
author’s right to an adequate remedy extremely difficult.”).
The Commission’s conclusion was not altered by the fact, which it noted with approval, that Uru-
guay had negotiated “important damages agreements” with a number of persons, including three of
the complainants before the Commission, for their injuries.  See Leonardo, supra note 70, at 165 ¶ 53.
90. See Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 95-96  ¶¶ 9-11, 97 ¶ 4; Herrera, supra note 71, at 49 ¶¶ 40-41;
Leonardo, supra note 70, at 164 ¶¶ 50-51.  Perhaps because El Salvador did not participate in the case
prior to the commission’s resolution, Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 96 ¶¶ 14-15, the reasoning of the
Salvadoran case is cryptic on the rights violated.  Clearer explanations may be found in the Uruguayan
and Argentinean cases.
91. Uruguay argued that the right of fair trial under the Convention protects only criminal defen-
dants, not complaining victims.  See Leonardo, supra note 70, at 158-59 ¶ 24.  The commission rejected
this contention, at least for those states, like Uruguay, which permit victims to participate as of right in
criminal proceedings.  Id. at 162-63 ¶¶ 39-46.  In the Argentinian case, the commission similarly held
that in those states, like Argentina, which grant victims the right to initiate criminal prosecutions, that
“fundamental civil right” may not be amnestied away in cases involving human rights without violating
the state’s duty to ensure the victim a fair trial.  See Herrera, supra note 71, at 47-48 ¶¶ 33-37.
92. See Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 97 ¶ 3; Herrera, supra note 71, at 47-48 ¶¶ 32-37; Leonardo,
supra note 70, at 169-71 ¶¶ 35-46.  Article 8.1 of the American Convention, supra note 76,  provides:
“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a com-
petent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any
accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations
of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”
93. See Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 95 ¶ 9, 97 ¶ 4; Herrera, supra note 71, at 49 ¶ 40; Leonardo,
supra note 70, at 164-65 ¶¶ 50, 53.
94. See Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 97 ¶ 3; Herrera, supra note 71, at 48 ¶¶ 38-39; Leonardo, su-
pra note 70, at 163 ¶¶ 47-49.  Article 25 of the American Convention, supra note 76, reads:
1.  Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a
competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the State concerned or by this Convention, even
though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their offi-
cial duties.
2.  The States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall
have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State; (b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) to ensure that the competent
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
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But what about the further duty to ensure prosecution and punishment of
violators?  On this point, the commission’s three resolutions are not entirely
clear or consistent.  All three cite the Inter-American Court’s language in the
Honduran case on the state’s duty to prosecute and punish human rights viola-
tors, without adding any suggestion that the language might not fully apply in
cases of amnesties.95
The Uruguayan and Argentine resolutions also refer to victims’ rights to
participate in judicial investigations in order to pursue penal sanctions.96  How-
ever, national laws in Uruguay and Argentina permit victim participation in
criminal proceedings; it appears that amnesties would not infringe this right in
states whose criminal procedures do not allow such participation.97
Finally, while the commission’s resolution in the Salvadoran case recom-
mends criminal punishment of violators,98 the Uruguayan and Argentine reso-
lutions, following the Inter-American Court’s Order in the Honduras case, do
not.99  Again, if the duty to prosecute and punish notwithstanding an amnesty
was clear, why not ask the State to carry it out?
This, then, was the state of Inter-American human rights case law on am-
nesties at the time the international community dealt with the amnesties in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti, all of which are discussed below.
3.  The Inter-American Commission and the 1993 Amnesty in El Salvador.
The Commission’s next comment on amnesties again left unresolved whether a
State may, by amnesty, refrain from prosecuting and punishing violators so
long as it conducts an investigation, allows victims to participate in judicial
proceedings where such systems exist, and provides adequate reparations.
In its 1994 country report on El Salvador,100 finding the “very sweeping”
1993 Salvadoran amnesty in violation of the American Convention,101 the
Commission reiterated its 1985-86 guidance and the criteria in its prior resolu-
                                                          
95. See Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 95 ¶¶ 9, 10; Herrera, supra note 71, at 49 ¶ 41; Leonardo, su-
pra note 70, at 164 ¶ 50.
96. The Commission found the Uruguay victims “frustrated in their right to … an impartial and
exhaustive judicial investigation which clarifies the facts, determines responsibilities and imposes the
corresponding penal sanctions.”  Leonardo, supra note 70, at 162 ¶ 39.  It found that the Argentine
amnesty “denied the victims their right to obtain a judicial investigation in a court of criminal law to
determine those responsible for the crimes committed and punish them accordingly.”  Herrera, supra
note 71, at 51 ¶ 50.
97. See supra note 91.
98. The Commission’s resolution in the Salvadoran case recommends an “exhaustive, rapid, com-
plete and impartial investigation concerning the event complained of, in order to identify all the vic-
tims and those responsible, and submit the latter to justice in order to establish their responsibility so
that they can receive the sanctions demanded by such serious actions.”  Las Hojas, supra note 69, at 92
¶ 5.
99. They recommend adoption of “measures necessary to clarify the facts and identify those re-
sponsible for the human rights violations,” but without expressly calling for prosecutions, convictions,
or punishment.  Herrera, supra note 71, at 51 ¶ 3; Leonardo, supra note 70, at 165 ¶ 3.
100. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, at 69-77, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 (1994).
101. Id. at 77.
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tions on El Salvador, Argentina, and Uruguay,102 but did not clarify whether
amnesties may foreclose prosecution and punishment.  However, it did identify
at least one and possibly three additional limits on amnesties.  First, the am-
nesty violated the Convention in part “because it applies to crimes against hu-
manity.”103  Second, amnesty could not be justified for perjury and other ob-
structions of justice by officers of the court and litigants, especially since many
grave human rights violations went unpunished because the country lacked a
“trustworthy, independent and effective judiciary.”104  (Although the commis-
sion’s strong language implies that this deficiency violated the Convention, it
did not expressly so state.)  Finally, the commission found the amnesty in viola-
tion of the Convention “because it makes possible a ‘reciprocal amnesty’ with-
out first acknowledging responsibility (despite the recommendations of the
Truth Commission) ….”105  This suggests that the Convention requires states to
condition amnesties on a prior acknowledgment of responsibility.  However,
the Commission did not clarify the contours of such a duty, nor whether it
would have applied absent the Truth Commission.106
4.  The United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Uruguayan
Amnesty.  A 1994 United Nations Human Rights Committee decision on the
Uruguayan amnesty partly addressed the question of prosecution and
punishment, by opining that victims have no right under the comparable U.N.
treaty107 to insist on criminal prosecutions of particular persons, although they
do have a right to investigation and compensation.108  But to say that victims
lack prosecutorial rights does not fully answer the question; states may have a
duty to prosecute even if victims have no standing to enforce it.  Indeed, the
committee came close to declaring such a duty:
The [c]ommittee moreover reaffirms its position that amnesties for gross violations of
human rights and legislation such as the [Uruguay amnesty law] are incompatible with
the obligations of the [s]tate party under the Covenant.  The [c]ommittee notes with
deep concern that the adoption of this law effectively excludes in a number of cases
the possibility of investigation into past human rights abuses and thereby prevents the
[s]tate party from discharging its responsibility to provide effective remedies to vic-
tims of those abuses.  Moreover, the [c]ommittee is concerned that, in adopting this
law, the [s]tate party has contributed to an atmosphere of impunity which may under-
mine the democratic order and give rise to further grave human rights violations.109
                                                          
102. See id. at 75-76.
103. Id. at 77.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 74-75.
105. Id. at 77.
106. The Truth Commission recommended that El Salvador “look at and acknowledge what hap-
pened must never happen again,” and, among other measures, recognize “the good name of the vic-
tims and of the serious crimes of which they were victims.”  TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
3, at 185, 186.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
108. See Rodríguez, supra note 89, at 5 ¶ 6.4, 7-8 ¶¶ 12.2-.4.
109. Id. ¶ 12.4 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  In footnote 5, the committee cited its com-
ments, adopted April 8, 1993, on Uruguay’s third periodic report under article 40 of the Covenant.
Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly, at 102-11, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40
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5.  The Inter-American Commission’s Most Recent Guidance: Chile’s Failure
to Repeal the Military Regime’s “Self-Amnesty.”  In two 1996 resolutions made
public in early 1997, the commission found that Chile’s continuing failure to
repeal the military regime’s 1978 “self-amnesty,” and its consequent failure to
prosecute cases of disappearances, summary and extrajudicial executions and
torture, violate its duties under article 1 of the American Convention to
“ensure” human rights, under article 2 to adopt legislative or other measures to
that end,110 under article 8.1 to ensure victims a fair trial, and under article 25 to
afford them judicial protection.111
The commission’s resolutions in the Chilean cases provide the most exten-
sive and eloquent exposition in the jurisprudence on the commission’s previ-
ously stated views that self-amnesties by extra-constitutional regimes are legal
nullities,112 that the seriousness of the crimes cannot be overlooked,113 that am-
nesties violate both the state’s duty to investigate114 and the victim’s right to
                                                          
(A/48/48), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/Add.4 (1993).  Accord, Comments of the Human Rights Committee,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (1995)(Argentina); Preliminary Observation of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCP/C/79/Add.67 (1996)(Peru); see also, Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, Comm. No 563/1993,
Views of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (Oct. 27, 1995).
110. Article 2 of the Convention provides, “Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms
referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties un-
dertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Conven-
tion, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”
American Convention, supra note 76, art. 2.
111. Garay Hermosilla et al., case no. 10.843, 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 156, 182-83 ¶¶ 105-09
[hereinafter Hermosilla]; Irma Reyes et al., cases 11.228 et al., 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 196, 219-20
¶¶ 103-08 [hereinafter Reyes].  The two cases are nearly identically worded; minor differences in the
English versions appear to be due mainly to differing translations of the Spanish originals.
When the Commission in a 1990 country report on Chile first considered the new democratic gov-
ernment’s approach to the prior regime’s human rights violations, the Commission was not critical.
Noting the dismissal pursuant to the amnesty of cases involving more than 130 disappeared persons,
and creation of an investigating commission that would not identify perpetrators, the Commission
nonetheless expressed its “decided support” for Chile’s initiative.  1989-90 ANN. REP. INT.-AM.
COMM’N. H. RTS. 135-40 (1990).  However, at that time, the ultimate interplay of amnesty and investi-
gations in Chile was not clear.  The Commission quoted President Aylwin’s announcement of the in-
vestigating commission, including his pledge that his government was “firmly resolved to cooperate
with the courts to the extent possible to enable them to fully play their role in determining individual
responsibility in every case that has or will come before them,” and his explanation that “[i]f in the
course of its work the Committee receives background information on acts that may be crimes, it will,
confidentially and without delay, so inform the appropriate court.”  Id. at 138-39.
Indeed, when the investigating commission completed its report, President Aylwin asked the Su-
preme Court to instruct lower courts to reactivate human rights cases, and informed the Court that in
his view, “the amnesty in force, which the Government respects, cannot be an obstacle to the realiza-
tion of a judicial investigation and the determination of responsibilities, especially in the cases of dis-
appeared persons.”  II TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 501.  The Court then instructed
judges to pursue cases and to reopen closed cases.  See id. at 502.
112. Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 163-66 ¶¶ 26-39; Reyes, supra note 111, at 200-04 ¶¶ 25-39.  See
also the eloquent concurring vote of Commissioner Fappiano in both cases.  1996 IAC, supra note 7, at
184-95, 222-33.
113. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 168-69 ¶¶ 46-48; Reyes, supra note 111, at 206-07 ¶¶ 46-48.
114. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 175-76 ¶¶ 73-78; Reyes, supra note 111, at 212-14 ¶¶ 72-77.
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prosecute criminal charges in states that allow it,115 and that amnesties also vio-
late the victims’ right to compensation116 and judicial protection.117  Perhaps
even more important is the commission’s clarification of two further points.
Chile’s new democratic government, like Argentina’s in 1992, had taken a se-
ries of measures: It recognized its duty to investigate, establishing an investi-
gating commission that issued a public report.  Chile’s President, in the name of
the state, asked for pardon from the families of the victims and publicly pro-
tested the decision of Chile’s Supreme Court to continue applying the amnesty
law.118  Chile also awarded a range of compensations to families of the victims,
including the following: a pension not less than the average for Chilean fami-
lies; expedited procedures to declare a presumption of death; special attention
from the State with regard to health, education, and housing; assistance with
debts; and exemption from obligatory military service for sons of victims.119
Even so, said the commission, the “[g]overnment’s recognition of responsibil-
ity, its partial investigation of the facts and its subsequent payment of compen-
sation” were not enough, unless the right to justice was also satisfied, to comply
with the state’s obligations under the Convention.120
Removing whatever doubts might remain from its earlier cases, the com-
mission clarified, first, that investigations must seek to identify perpetrators;
otherwise victims will find it “virtually impossible” to establish civil liability of
the wrongdoers for damages.121  Accordingly, the commission further found that
the amnesty violated the right to judicial protection under article 25 of the
Convention, in part because it “rendered the crimes legally without effect, and
deprived the victims and their families of any legal recourse through which they
might identify those responsible for violating their human rights during the
military dictatorship, and bring them to justice”—that is, in the more precise
English translation of Reyes, make the violators “subject to the corresponding
penalties.”122  Second, the commission made clear that, in its view of the Con-
                                                          
115. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 172-73 ¶¶ 62-67; Reyes, supra note 111, at 210-11 ¶¶ 61-66.
116. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 173 ¶¶ 65-67; Reyes, supra note 111, at 210-11 ¶¶ 64-66.
117. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 173-74 ¶¶ 68-72; Reyes, supra note 111, at 211-12 ¶¶ 67-71.
118. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 167 ¶ 41; Reyes, supra note 111, at 204-05 ¶ 41.
119. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 171 ¶ 57; Reyes, supra note 111, at 209 ¶ 56.
120. See Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 171 ¶ 58, 176 ¶ 77; Reyes, supra note 111, at 209 ¶ 57,  214 ¶
76.
121. Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 173 ¶ 66; Reyes, supra note 111, at 211 ¶ 65.
122. Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 174 ¶ 71; Reyes, supra note 111, at 212 ¶ 70.  The English
translation of  Hermosilla, quoted in the text above and stating that the amnesty deprived the victims
of a recourse by which to “bring [those responsible] to justice,” is not as precise as it should be with
respect to the state’s obligation to punish.  The original Spanish sentence is as follows:
El Decreto ley de amnistía dio lugar a una ineficacia jurídica de los delitos, y dejó a las vícti-
mas y a sus familias sin ningún recurso judicial a través del cual se pudiese identificar a los re-
sponsables de las violaciones de derechos humanos cometidas durante la dictadura militar, e
imponerles los castigos correspondientes.
Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 174 ¶ 71 (Spanish) (emphasis added).
The more accurate English translation of the same passage in Reyes states that the amnesty law
“left the victims and their families with no judicial recourse whereby those responsible for the viola-
tions of  human rights committed  during  the military dictatorship could be identified and made subject
to the corresponding penalties.”  Reyes, supra note 111, at 212 ¶ 70 (emphasis added).
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vention, an amnesty violates the state’s duty to prosecute and punish perpetra-
tors of serious violations.  Citing the court’s decision in the Honduran case, the
commission stated: “According to the provisions of [a]rticle 1.1 [of the Conven-
tion], the State has the obligation to investigate all violations that have been
committed within its jurisdiction, for the purpose of  identifying the persons re-
sponsible, imposing appropriate punishment on them and ensuring adequate
reparations for the victims.”123  Moreover, in this case (as in the 1992 Salva-
doran case), the commission’s recommendations to the state specified that the
investigations must be for the purpose of “identifying the guilty parties, estab-
lishing their responsibilities and effectively prosecuting them, thereby guaran-
teeing to the victims and their families the right to justice that pertains to
them.”  Again, in the more precise Reyes English translation, the state’s duty is
not merely that the guilty be effectively prosecuted, but that they be
“effectively punished.”124
After the Chilean cases, there seems little doubt that in the view of the
commission, amnesties for serious violations of human rights violate multiple
provisions of the Convention.  It is now clear that nothing less than judicial in-
vestigations designed to identify perpetrators, name names, and punish the
guilty will suffice.  It remains to be seen whether Chile will comply with the
commission’s resolutions.125
                                                          
123. Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 176 ¶ 77 (emphasis added); Reyes, supra note 111, at 214 ¶ 76.
124. Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 183 ¶ 111 (emphasis added); Reyes, supra note 111, at 221 ¶
109.  The English translation of Hermosilla, quoted in the text above with respect to the state’s duty of
“effectively prosecuting” the guilty, is imprecise.  The original Spanish states that the investigations
must be “a fin de que se individualice a los culpables, se establezcan sus responsabilidades y sean efec-
tivamente sancionados, garantizando a las víctimas y a sus familiares el derecho a la justicia que les
asiste.”  Hermosilla, supra note 111, at 183 ¶ 111 (Spanish) (emphasis added).  As in the case of note
122 supra, the  Reyes translation is more precise, stating that the investigation must be such that the
guilty are “effectively punished.”  Reyes, supra note 111, at 221 ¶ 109.
125. As the Commission recognized in the resolutions, Chile’s Government has attempted to over-
come the 1978 amnesty, but the Senate, some of whose members are still not democratically elected,
has to date refused to repeal the amnesty, and the judiciary continues to apply it.  See, e.g., Hermosilla,
supra note 111, at 167 ¶ 41, 172 ¶ 61, 177-80 ¶¶ 79-93, 181-82 ¶¶ 99-103.  Even so, there may be hope.
Aside from the conviction and imprisonment of two high-ranking officers in the Letelier murder case
(exempted from the 1978 amnesty), see supra notes 11 and 54, at least two additional kinds of judicial
human rights proceedings are pending in Chile.  First, some human rights crimes occurring after the
1978 amnesty have been prosecuted.  For example, Major Carlos Herrera received a ten-year sentence
for a 1982 murder and has also been convicted for the 1984 death of a political activist.  See COUNTRY
REPORTS 1996, supra note 13, at 382.
Second is the so-called “Aylwin Doctrine.”  As explained by the U.S. State Department, that doc-
trine interprets the 1978 amnesty such that
the courts should not close a case involving a disappearance … until either the bodies are
found or credible evidence is provided to indicate that an individual is dead.  This could affect
up to 542 cases, which cover about 1,100 persons … . The application of the Aylwin Doctrine,
however, has been uneven, as some courts continued the practice of applying the 1978 am-
nesty to disappearances without conducting an investigation to identify the perpetrators.  The
courts closed 16 cases during the first half of [1996] through application of the amnesty; 170
cases are active; and an additional 356 cases are temporarily closed but subject to being re-
opened.
 Id.
Most recently, former President Aylwin has publicly stated that General Pinochet should be judged
in a “trial like Nuremberg” for the deaths and disappearances under the military regime.  Calvin Sims,
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6.  Applicable International Humanitarian Law.  Article 6(5) of Protocol II
to the Geneva Conventions calls for the “broadest possible amnesty” following
conflicts of a non-international character.126  This provision has occasionally
been cited as an international legal justification of amnesties for gross
violations of human rights committed during the recent civil wars in Latin
America.127
Such citations are misplaced.  Article 6(5) seeks merely to encourage am-
nesty for combat activities otherwise subject to prosecution as violations of the
criminal laws of the states in which they take place.  It is not meant to support
amnesties for violations of international humanitarian law.
This interpretation is confirmed by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (“ICRC”), the agency under whose auspices the Geneva Conventions
were negotiated and are administered.  The ICRC’s interpretation of Article
6(5), communicated in 1995 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and reiterated in 1997, is as follows:
Article 6(5) of Protocol II is the only and very limited equivalent in the law of non in-
ternational armed conflict of what is known in the law of international armed conflict
as “combatant immunity”, i.e., the fact that a combatant may not be punished for acts
of  hostility, including killing enemy combatants, as long as he respected international
humanitarian law, and that he has to be repatriated at the end of active hostilities.  In
non-international armed conflicts, no such principle exists, and those who fight may
be punished, under national legislation, for the mere fact of having fought, even if
they respected international humanitarian law.  The “travaux préparatoires” of
[article] 6(5) indicate that this provision aims at encouraging amnesty, i.e., a sort of
release at the end of hostilities, for those detained or punished for the mere fact of
having participated in hostilities.  It does not aim at an amnesty for those having vio-
lated international humanitarian law.128
                                                          
Killing Casts Focus on Abuse in Chile’s Military, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at A8.
126. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 26, art. 6(5) (“At the cessation of
hostilities, authorities in power shall procure granting the broadest possible amnesty to persons that
have taken part in the armed conflict or that are deprived of their liberty, detained or interned by mo-
tives related with the armed conflict.”).
127. See, e.g., Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador on the Amnesty Law, Pro-
ceedings No. 10-93 (May 20, 1993), reprinted in III TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 549, 555.
128. Letter from Dr. Toni Pfanner, Head of the Legal Division, ICRC Headquarters, Geneva, to
author (Apr. 15, 1977) (on file with author)(emphasis added).  The ICRC interpretation goes on to cite
a statement by the Soviet delegate at the Diplomatic Conference at which Protocol II was negotiated,
that the provision which later became article 6(5) “could not be construed as enabling war criminals,
or those guilty of crimes against peace and humanity, to evade severe punishment in any circumstances
whatsoever.”  Id. at 1-2.
On the separate point of whether international humanitarian law prohibits amnesties for violations
of its norms, the ICRC interpretation concludes ambiguously: “Conversely, one cannot either affirm
that international humanitarian law absolutely excludes any amnesty including persons having commit-
ted violations of international humanitarian law, as long as the principle that those having committed
grave breaches have to be either prosecuted or extradited is not voided of its substance.”  Id. at 2.  In
any event, regardless of whether international humanitarian law prohibits such amnesties, Inter-
American human rights law prohibits them as described in the text supra, to the extent the same con-
duct may also constitute serious violations of human rights.  See generally, e.g., TRUTH COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (“With few exceptions, serious acts of violence prohibited by the rules of
humanitarian law applicable to the Salvadoran conflict are also violations of the non-repealable provi-
sions of the … American Convention on Human Rights … .”).
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International humanitarian law thus does not contradict or support an exemp-
tion from the restrictions imposed by Inter-American human rights law on am-
nesties for serious violations of human rights.
7.  Amnesty Guidelines Based on Jurisprudence.  In short, under OAS
jurisprudence on amnesties for human rights violations, there remained some
question after 1992 (since removed by the Chilean cases) as to whether states
must prosecute and punish violators.  But even by 1992, the following
guidelines were clear for amnesties covering serious violations of human rights:
(1)  To be legally valid at all, amnesties must be adopted
by democratic bodies, usually the legislature; self-
amnesties by lawless regimes are not valid.129
(2)  Amnesties may not foreclose investigations of viola-
tions, sufficient to vindicate both society’s right to
know the truth and survivors’ right to know what
happened to their relatives.130
(3)  Amnesties must not preclude victims from initiating
or participating in judicial criminal investigations, at
least in states that have such procedures.131
(4)  Amnesties may not foreclose or in practical effect
substantially limit the right of victims or survivors to
obtain adequate compensation for violations.132
By 1994 the following additional guidelines were clear:
(5)  Amnesties must not apply to crimes against human-
ity.133
(6)  Amnesties should not apply to perjury and other ob-
structions of justice by officers of the court and liti-
gants.134
(7)  Amnesties should not be given without an acknowl-
edgment by the state of responsibility for past viola-
tions.135
And after publication of the Chilean cases in early 1997, the following
additional guidelines are now clear:
                                                          
129. See supra notes 62, 111 and accompanying text.  See generally the Inter-American Court’s Ad-
visory Opinion on “The Word ‘Laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights,”
Adv. Op. OC-6/86, 1986 ANN. REP. INT.-AM. CT.  H. RTS. 13, 22 ¶ 38 (1986) (“[T]he word ‘laws’ in
Article 30 of the Convention [which allows restrictions of human rights by law] means a general legal
norm tied to the general welfare, passed by democratically elected legislative bodies established by the
Constitution, and formulated according to the procedures set forth by the constitutions of the [s]tates
parties for that purpose.”).
130. See supra notes 63-65, 90, 108, 114 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 91-92, 115 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 89, 93-94, 116 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 49, 103, 113 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 105-06, 120 and accompanying text.
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(8)  Investigations must seek to identify those responsible
and name names; otherwise they are insufficient.136
(9)  States must prosecute and punish perpetrators of se-
rious human rights violations; they may not be am-
nestied.137
OAS and U.N. officials, diplomats, and peacemakers should be made aware of
these guidelines.
B.  Recent Inter-American Treaties
In addition to the American Convention on Human Rights, three recent In-
ter-American treaties further restrict amnesties for serious violations of human
rights and, at least in states parties, impose duties to punish which appear in-
consistent with amnesties.  The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture,138 in force since 1987, has thirteen states parties and seven addi-
tional signatories as of April 1997.139  It imposes on states a duty to take effec-
tive measures to punish torture140 and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment,141 and either to take jurisdiction over or to extradite
torturers.142  States must also guarantee alleged victims “the right to an impar-
tial examination,” and must initiate an immediate investigation and, “whenever
appropriate, the corresponding criminal process.”143  In addition, states under-
take to adopt laws “guaranteeing adequate compensation for victims of tor-
ture.”144
The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons,145 in
force since 1996, has five states parties and eight additional signatories.146
States parties undertake to punish forced disappearances147 and either to take
jurisdiction over or to extradite perpetrators.148
                                                          
136. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 123, 124 and accompanying text.
138. Dec. 9, 1985, OAS Treaty Series No. 67, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42 (SEPF) [hereinafter Inter-
American Torture Convention].
139. See 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 788.  States parties are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,  Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela.  Additional signatories are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, and Nica-
ragua.  Id.  The only reservation in force to date, by Chile, does not concern the duty to punish.  See id.
at 790.
140. See Inter-American Torture Convention, supra note 138, arts. 1, 6.
141. See id. art. 6.
142. See id. arts. 11, 12, 13.  On treaties imposing a duty to punish or extradite, see generally M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE
OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995).
143. Inter-American Torture Convention, supra note 138, art. 8.
144. Id. art. 9.
145. June 9, 1994, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.3114/94 rev. 1, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994)
[hereinafter Inter-American Disappearances Convention]
146. See 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 791.  States parties are Argentina, Costa Rica, Panama, Para-
guay, and Uruguay.  Additional signatories include Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.  There are no reservations to date.  See id.
147. See Inter-American Disappearances Convention, supra note 145, art. I.
148. See id. arts. IV, V, VI.
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Citing both of these treaties, the Inter-American Commission commented
in the Chilean cases that some human rights crimes are “deemed sufficiently
serious that they have been used to justify the adoption, in various interna-
tional instruments, of measures specifically aimed at avoiding impunity, in-
cluding universal jurisdiction and the removal of all time limits with respect to
prosecuting crimes.”149
Finally, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment,
and Eradication of Violence Against Women,150 in force since 1995, has twenty-
six states parties and one additional signatory.151  States parties agree to pursue
policies to punish and to apply due diligence to investigate and impose penal-
ties for violence against women,152 and to establish legal procedures with effec-
tive access to protective measures and a timely hearing,153 as well as effective
access to reparations.154
In short, in addition to the restrictions on amnesties based on jurisprudence
set forth in the preceding subsection, states parties to these treaties assume a
duty to prosecute and punish (or, in the case of torture and forced disappear-
ances, extradite) perpetrators of torture; of other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; of forced disappearances; and of violence against
women.  Since nothing in the language or object and purpose of the treaties
contemplates amnesties,155 the treaties may fairly be interpreted to preclude
amnesties for these human rights violations.
IV
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Unfortunately, as shown in the following discussions of the U.N. roles in
Guatemala in 1994-96 and El Salvador in 1992-93 and of the role of the interna-
tional community in Haiti in 1993-94, diplomats have not put the Inter-
American Human Rights jurisprudence (or, with the recent exception of Gua-
temala, treaty law) into peacemaking practice.
                                                          
149. E.g., Hermosilla,  supra note 111, at 168-69 ¶ 47 & n.7 (citing, with regard to universal jurisdic-
tion, article 11 of the Torture Convention and articles V and VI of the Disappearances Convention).
With regard to imprescriptibility, the Commission cited article VII of the Disappearances Convention
(which allows as an alternative, in states where prescriptions are mandatory, use of the prescription
period corresponding to the most serious crimes recognized by the state).
150. June 9, 1994,  reprinted in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,  Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System (Updated to May 1996), 95, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92, doc.31 rev.3 (1996), at 109 [hereinafter Inter-American Violence Against Women
Convention].
151. See 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 792.  States Parties are Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The additional
signatory is Mexico.  No reservations have been made to date.  See id.
152. See Inter-American Violence Against Women Convention, supra note 150, arts. 7, 7(b).
153. See id. art. 7(f).
154. See id. art. 7(g).
155. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1).
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A. The United Nations in Guatemala in 1994-96
Prior to the peace negotiations of 1994-96, Guatemalan military regimes
had awarded themselves amnesties in 1982 and 1986 for political crimes and
related common crimes.156  As self-amnesties by undemocratic regimes, they
plainly lack legal validity under the criteria set forth by the Inter-American
Commission.157
In the most recent (and successful) round of peace negotiations between the
government and the guerrillas mediated by the United Nations, a 1994 agree-
ment on human rights held implicit promise that an amnesty for serious viola-
tions of human rights would not be permitted.  Guatemala agreed that the
“[g]overnment shall not sponsor the adoption of legislative or any other type of
measures designed to prevent the prosecution and punishment of persons re-
sponsible for human rights violations.”158  Guatemala agreed further that “[n]o
special law or exclusive jurisdiction may be invoked to uphold impunity in re-
spect of human rights violations.”159  Yet the implicit promise did not fully ma-
terialize.  A later 1994 agreement on a truth commission provided that “[t]he
Commission shall not attribute responsibility to any individual in its work, rec-
ommendations, and report ….”160  Absent some other mechanism, this ap-
peared to fall short of Inter-American requirements at the time for exposing
the truth and enabling victims to hold violators at least civilly responsible.161
By early 1996, there were indications that a “blanket amnesty” might be
written into the final peace agreements.162  A concerned Human Rights Watch
wrote to United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the nations as-
sisting the peace process, asking that “gross violations of human rights” be ex-
cluded from any amnesty.  In August, United Nations Under-Secretary-
General Marrack Goulding replied, assuring that the United Nations could not
condone any agreement that would violate the principles of human rights and
international law on which the United Nations was founded.163  That was all
well and good, but what did it mean?  Lacking explicit U.N. guidelines for ac-
ceptable amnesties in the area of human rights, neither Human Rights Watch
nor the United Nations itself could be sure.164
                                                          
156. See Norris, supra note 14, at 66-69.  Guatemala also extended two other amnesties, in 1983 and
1987, that theoretically benefited guerrillas, but which had unrealistic conditions for acceptance.  Id. at
67-68, 69-70.
157. See supra note 129.
158. Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, Mar. 29, 1994, § III(1), U.N. Doc. A/48/928 -
S/1994/448, Annex 1 (1994).
159. Id. § III (3).
160. Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations
and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, June 28, 1994, section on
“Operation,” ¶ III, U.N. Doc. A/48/954-S/1994/751, annex II (1994).
161. See supra notes 130, 132 and accompanying text.
162. See HRW 1997, supra note 6, at 102.
163. See id.
164. In December 1996, on the eve of the final agreement, this author met with a senior U.N. offi-
cial in Guatemala, who acknowledged uncertainty as to which human rights violations could be amnes-
tied without violating international law.
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Following the final, December 1996 agreement on amnesty, a “Law of Na-
tional Reconciliation” was adopted that same month.  It allows extinction of
criminal responsibility for the following: political crimes against the state, the
institutional order, and public administration; common crimes “directly, objec-
tively, intentionally, and causally” linked to political crimes; and common
crimes perpetrated with the aim of preventing, impeding, or pursuing political
and related common crimes.165  However, it expressly excludes genocide,166 tor-
ture,167 and forced disappearances,168 as well as any crimes for which amnesty is
prohibited by Guatemalan law or by Guatemala’s international treaty obliga-
tions.169  But what about extrajudicial executions, and even massacres of whole
villages, that do not amount to genocide?  The agreement and law said nothing
of customary international law as a constraint on amnesties.170  Moreover, at
best, it may be left to victims to litigate before Guatemalan courts whether the
crimes covered by the amnesty law are limited by the American Convention on
Human Rights, which does not expressly address amnesties, but which has been
interpreted by the Inter-American Commission to preclude them for serious
violations of human rights.171
The Lawyers Committee on Human Rights predicts that the results of Gua-
temala’s amnesty law are likely to be “a wave of dismissed investigations in-
volving allegations of serious human rights abuses; the termination of several
landmark prosecution cases, … [and] the release of the tiny fraternity of mili-
tary personnel who have been jailed for human rights crimes.”172  (Whether this
prediction will materialize remains to be seen; as of the end of  February 1997,
requests for amnesty under the law had been denied in at least two prominent
cases of  alleged political assassinations, and a constitutional challenge to the
law was pending.)173  Yet a public statement by the United Nations Mission in
Guatemala following adoption of the law, while interpreting the amnesty nar-
rowly,  added that the hard choice about the proper scope of  an amnesty con-
sistent with international obligations belonged “exclusively to the Guatemalan
people.”174
                                                          
165. 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 719-20.
166. See id. at 720.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.; see also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Advocacy Alert: Amnesty Law in
Guatemala Threatens the Prosecution of Human Rights Violators, Including Those Responsible for
the Myrna Mack Murder, Dec. 1996, unnumbered at 2.
170. See id.
171. See part III.A, supra.  The amnesty procedures call for prompt judicial rulings on applicability
of the amnesty to particular cases.  Only if the court desires more information is there to be a hearing
at which the defendant and victim can appear.  See id. at 1-2.
172. Id. at 2.
173. See 1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 720.
174. MINUGUA comparte plenamente lo afirmado por el Moderador de las Naciones Unidas,
quien, con ocasión de la firma del Acuerdo del 12 de Diciembre, reconoció cuán necesario y
difícil es, para una sociedad que emerge de un prolongado enfrentamiento armado interno,
encontrar el equilibrio aceptable entre las exigencias de la paz, la justicia, la verdad y la rec-
onciliación nacional.  Encontrar una solución adecuada a esta compleja exigencia, compatible
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Had there been U.N. guidelines incorporating Inter-American jurispru-
dence on amnesties, at least for U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Americas,
it would have been difficult either for the U.N. mediator to accept Guatemala’s
amnesty or for the United Nations Mission to condone it.
B.  The United Nations in El Salvador in 1992-93
Prior to the U.N.-mediated peace negotiations of 1991-92, El Salvador in
1987 granted an amnesty for political crimes and for related common crimes
when the number of perpetrators was not fewer than twenty (that is, when a
military unit was accused of a massacre or other serious crime in violation of
human rights).175  In an opinion not published until after the January 1992 Sal-
vadoran peace accords, the Inter-American Commission later found that am-
nesty to violate the American Convention on Human Rights.176  Meanwhile,
U.N. mediators were helping to negotiate the peace accords.  The final, January
1992 agreement included the following paragraph, which, without addressing
amnesty expressly, appeared to restrict it by implication:
5.  End to Impunity
The [p]arties recognize the need to clarify and put an end to any indication of impu-
nity on the part of the officers of the armed forces, particularly in cases where respect
for human rights is jeopardized.  To that end, the [p]arties refer this issue to the
Commission on the Truth for consideration and resolution.  All of this shall be with-
out prejudice to the principle, which the [p]arties also recognize, that acts of this na-
ture … must be the object of exemplary action by the law courts so that the punish-
ment prescribed by law is meted out to those found responsible.177
In other words, recognizing that military impunity should be put to an end and
human rights violations punished, the agreement deferred the specific applica-
tion of these principles to the Truth Commission.  Legislation adopted soon
thereafter similarly deferred the issue, granting amnesty for all political and
related common crimes during the war, except those committed by persons
named by the Truth Commission.178
The Truth Commission’s March 1993 report did not specifically address
amnesty.  Instead, it confronted a “serious dilemma”:
The question is not whether the guilty should be punished but whether justice can be
done.  Public morality demands that those responsible for the crimes described here
be punished.  However, El Salvador has no system for the administration of justice
                                                          
con las obligaciones internacionales, compete exclusivamente al pueblo de Guatemala, a
través de sus instituciones, tanto en el ámbito legislativo como en el jurisdiccional, y de las di-
versas expresiones de la sociedad civil.
Declaración Pública del Director de MINUGUA, Dec. 20, 1996, ¶ 5 (on file with author).
Together with Guatemala’s Presidential Commission on human rights, the U.N. Mission did later take
“steps to inform judges of the relationship between the provisions of this law and Guatemala’s interna-
tional treaty obligations.”  1996 IAC, supra note 7, at 720.
175. See Norris, supra note 14, at 94-100.
176. See supra note 69.
177. TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 192.
178. See I TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 327.
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which meets the minimum requirements of objectivity and impartiality so that justice
can be rendered reliably.179
Faced with the impossibility of fair prosecutions at least in the short run,
the Commission might have given its blessing to an amnesty.  Fortunately, it
deliberately refrained from doing so.  It concluded instead that “for now, the
only judicial system which the Commission could trust to administer justice in a
full and timely manner would be one which had been restructured in the light
of the peace agreements.”180  In other words, prosecutions would be contingent
on prior reform of El Salvador’s judicial system, as called for by the peace ac-
cords.
In retrospect, it would have been preferable for the Commission not only to
refrain from condoning an amnesty, but expressly to preclude one.  Not only
“public morality” as stated by the Commission, but international law as set
forth in the text above, demanded prosecution of serious violations of human
rights.
In any event, the government of El Salvador immediately shut the door on
any possibility of prosecutions following judicial reform.  In March of 1993, un-
der pressure from the military, it enacted a “broad, absolute and unconditional
amnesty … in favor of all those who … participated in political crimes, crimes
with political ramifications, or common crimes committed by no less than
twenty people, before January 1st 1992 ….”181
Had the United Nations Secretary-General been informed of the state of
international law on amnesties, at least in the Americas, he could have de-
nounced this amnesty as a violation of international law.182  Instead, he issued a
weak statement, characterizing the amnesty as a “matter of concern” because it
related to the Truth Commission’s report.  “It would have been better,” he of-
fered, “if the amnesty had been taken after a broad degree of national consen-
sus had been created in favor of it.”183
No, it would not have been better.  Under Inter-American law as ex-
pounded by late 1992, the 1993 amnesty law violated El Salvador’s interna-
tional legal obligations, a fact which no amount of public consultation could
suffice to overcome.184  In short, U.N. guidelines on amnesties might have led
the Truth Commission to be more explicit beforehand, and the Secretary-
General to be more critical afterward.  And as El Salvador reforms its judici-
                                                          
179. TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 178.
180. Id. at 179.
181. III TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 546, 547.
182. The Supreme Court of El Salvador, in May of 1993, ruled that it could not pass judgment on
the amnesty because amnesty is a political question.  See id. at 549.  It is unlikely that even a clear cut
pronouncement by the United Nations that the amnesty violated international law, would have led the
then still unreformed Salvadoran court to invalidate the law.
183. Leopold, supra note 38.  In a July 1997 report, the successor Secretary-General characterized
El Salvador’s March 1993 amnesty as a “clear rejection of the conclusions of the Truth Commission.”
Evaluation of the Peace Process in El Salvador, Report of the Sectretary-General, U.N.G.A. doc.
A/51/917, July 1, 1997.
184. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
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ary185 and the political opposition gains seats in the national legislature,186 the
potential for timely and forceful U.N. condemnation of the amnesty eventually
to bear prosecutorial fruit becomes more apparent.
C.  The International Community in Haiti in 1993-94
During 1993 and 1994, U.N., OAS, and U.S. diplomats sought to persuade
the regime of General Raoul Cedras, which had ousted Haiti’s democratically
elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, to restore democratic rule
and permit President Aristide’s return to power.187  During these efforts, which
ultimately succeeded in September 1994, the diplomats negotiated two amnesty
agreements to ease fears of the Haitian military that, if they ceded power, they
would be prosecuted for the coup and for the 3,000 civilians murdered under
their regime.188
The first agreement, signed at Governor’s Island, New York in July of 1993,
was mediated by the representative of the United Nations and OAS, former
Argentinian Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, and by the U.S. Special Envoy,
Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo.189  Contemplating Aristide’s return to Haiti in
October of 1993, the agreement envisioned “an amnesty granted by the Presi-
dent of the Republic within the framework of article 147 of the National Con-
stitution.”190
The Governor’s Island amnesty, although vague and ambiguous, might rea-
sonably have been interpreted in a manner consistent with international human
rights law.  Its “framework”—article 147 of Haiti’s Constitution—provides that
the president “may grant amnesty only for political matters as stipulated by
law.”191  One could argue that the overthrow of Haiti’s government was a
“political matter,” which could be amnestied, but that ensuing serious viola-
tions of human rights were not.
Unfortunately, the United States, at least, did not read it that way: “U.S. of-
ficials have acknowledged that during August and September of 1993, they pre-
sented [Haitian] Prime Minister designate Malval with drafts of amnesty laws
similar to those passed in other countries, which covered not just crimes against
the state but also serious human rights abuses against civilians.”192  In any event,
the agreement came to naught, as the Cedras regime refused to relinquish
                                                          
185. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995, at 91 (1994).
186. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, Salvadoran Left Finds Ballot Box a Potent Weapon; Moderate Leads
Former Rebels to Uneasy Parity with Ruling Party, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
187. See generally Scharf, supra note 14.
188. See id. at 4.
189. See id. at 5-7.
190. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
191. Id. at 6 n.33.
192. Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND NAT’L COALITION FOR
HAITIAN REFUGEES, TERROR PREVAILS IN HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND FAILED
DIPLOMACY 35 (1994)).
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power as agreed.193
As a result, at U.S. urging, the United Nations Security Council in July of
1994 authorized a military invasion to dislodge Cedras.194  In September 1994,
as U.S.  invasion planes were already airborne, President Clinton’s special mis-
sion to Haiti, headed by former President Jimmy Carter, negotiated a second
amnesty agreement.  General Cedras agreed to step down “when a general am-
nesty will be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or October 15, 1994,
whichever is earlier.”195
From the point of view of international human rights law, this “general am-
nesty” was even more troublesome than the ambiguous Governor’s Island
agreement.  Gone was the express reference to the Haitian constitutional pro-
vision limiting amnesties to “political matters.”  Still, since the amnesty had to
be enacted by Haiti’s Parliament, one might argue that the Constitution im-
plicitly constrained the Parliament’s action.  But since the entire agreement was
extra-constitutional, who could be sure that its implementation was not as well?
U.S. public clarifications did not dispel the ambiguity.  Secretary of State
Christopher stated for the record that the United States interpreted the agree-
ment to provide a “broad amnesty for all the members of the military.”196  Yes,
but for which crimes—the coup itself or the subsequent murders of civilians?
When Haiti’s Parliament enacted the amnesty law in October of 1994, the
ambiguity was only partially resolved.  The “political matter” limitation was re-
stored, but it was defined so loosely that it might be construed to cover human
rights violations.  According to the law, the President’s amnesty power under
the Constitution “only applies to political matters, that is to say in all cases of
crimes and misdemeanors against the state, internal and external security,
crimes and misdemeanors affecting public order and accessory crimes and mis-
demeanors as defined by the Penal Code.”197
By referring to presidential power, the law in effect passed the buck to
President Aristide.  His amnesty decree, issued the next day, was still ambigu-
ous, granting amnesty to the “authors and accomplices” of the coup, without
specifying whether they were amnestied only for the coup itself or for the sub-
sequent brutality.198  In practice, however, his administration did subsequently
prosecute at least a few former military, police, and paramilitary personnel for
assassinations of Aristide’s major supporters.199
In short, it appears that if the Haitian amnesty was consistent with interna-
tional human rights law at the time,200 it was so in spite of, not because of the in-
                                                          
193. See id. at 7.
194. See id.
195. Id. at n.48.
196. Id. at n.49.
197. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 17.
199. See id. at 18 n.121.
200. Professor Scharf argues that the Haitian amnesty, which did not foreclose private suits for
damages and was accompanied by a truth commission and at least some prosecutions, did not violate
Inter-American jurisprudence at the time.  Id. at 28.   If interpreted to permit amnesty for serious hu-
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ternational community’s role.
V
CONCLUSION
The following guidelines reflect rulings of the Inter-American Court and
Commission on Human Rights, as well as Inter-American Human Rights trea-
ties.201  They should be adopted for use by diplomats and officials of the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, the U.S. government, and other
governments involved in peacemaking, for amnesties covering serious viola-
tions of human rights in the Americas:
(1)  Democratic Adoption: To be legally valid at all, amnes-
ties must be adopted by democratic bodies, usually the
legislature; self-amnesties by lawless regimes are not
valid.
(2)  Investigations: Amnesties may not foreclose investiga-
tions of violations, sufficient to vindicate both society’s
right to know the truth and survivors’ right to know what
happened to their relatives.
(3)  Naming Names: Investigations must seek to identify
those responsible and name names; otherwise they are
insufficient.
(4)  Victim Participation: Amnesties must not preclude vic-
tims from initiating or participating in judicial criminal
investigations, at least in states that have such proce-
dures.
(5)  Compensation: Amnesties may not foreclose or in practi-
cal effect substantially limit the right of victims or survi-
vors to obtain adequate compensation for violations.
(6)  Crimes Against Humanity: Amnesties must not apply to
crimes against humanity, including forced disappear-
ances.
(7)  Obstruction of Justice: Amnesties should not apply to
perjury and other obstructions of justice by officers of
the court and litigants.
(8)  Treaty Crimes: In states parties to the applicable Inter-
American Conventions, amnesties may not be given for
torture, for cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, or for violence against women.
(9)  State Acknowledgment of Responsibility: Amnesties
should not be given without an acknowledgment by the
                                                          
man rights violations, however, it would not likely meet the higher standards clarified in the later Chil-
ean cases.  See supra note 111.
201. See supra notes 129-55.
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state of responsibility for past violations.
(10)  Prosecution and Punishment: States must prosecute and
effectively punish perpetrators of serious human rights
violations; such perpetrators may not be amnestied.
Plainly these guidelines, especially the last one, are a tall order.  As written,
they are absolute and inflexible; if the last guideline in particular were followed
without exception, no amnesty for serious violations of human rights would
ever pass muster.  Creative approaches like South Africa’s would be no more
acceptable than the most cynical of self-amnesties.  So unyielding a set of con-
straints poses a risk that policymakers might decline to accept.
This risk counsels caution in articulating and applying such guidelines.  Soft
law202 offers one means of accommodating the need for caution.  If the guide-
lines were embodied as hard law in a treaty, then either an absolutist approach,
or exceptions or qualifications, might have to be expressly provided.  Similarly,
if they were asserted as hard customary law, courts might be compelled to con-
sider potential exceptions and qualifications in defining and applying a custom-
ary rule.
A soft law approach does not altogether moot such problems.  However, it
avoids the necessity for their systematic and comprehensive resolution at the
outset, in the abstract.  Stating the norms as guidelines for the conduct of inter-
national and U.S. officials allows them to be treated as just that, guidelines.
Like the jurisprudence from which they mainly derive, developed case by case,
they could be applied and if necessary tailored to fit individual cases.
If they are to be honored in the practice and not in the breach, of course,
the guidelines must not be taken lightly.  To discard or amend them at will, or
whenever convenient, would defeat their purpose.  Still, guidelines for the con-
duct of officials may allow for a narrowly circumscribed degree of flexibility.
For example, the United Nations, OAS, and United States could require that
their officials presumptively follow them, unless extraordinary reasons were
found to question their application in a particular case.  In that event, prior to
allowing any departure from the guidelines, those reasons would need to be
clearly articulated and, at a minimum, to receive consideration and express ap-
proval by senior officials, following receipt of  a legal opinion on all applicable
treaties and jurisprudence relating to impunity.
Such an approach would be consistent with the policy-oriented approach of
the New Haven School, which conceives of international law as an ongoing
process of authoritative decisionmaking, in which legal criteria serve not as me-
chanical limits, but as explicitly postulated public order goals, reflecting values
of human dignity, to guide decisionmakers.203  While the policy-oriented ap-
                                                          
202. For the distinction between “hard” and “soft” international law—essentially,  but not entirely,
the difference between formally binding and non-binding obligations—see, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin,
The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change  in International Law, 38 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 850
(1989); Gruchalla-Wesierski, A  Framework  for Understanding Soft Law, 30 MCGILL L.J. 37 (1984).
203. See, e.g., LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 14-15, 19-20 (1989).
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proach may understate the potential of “hard” international law, it aptly de-
scribes the “soft law” function of the guidelines suggested here.
If international legal constraints on amnesties for serious violations of hu-
man rights are to serve their purpose, they must not only be sound as a matter
of justice, they must be used in practice.  Articulating strong presumptions
against such amnesties, but doing so through the form suggested here— guide-
lines for the conduct of international community officials—may stand a better
chance than either treaty or customary law of achieving both objectives.
